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 Econometrica, Vol. 58, No. 6 (November, 1990), 1321-1339
 PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INFORMATION: AN EXPERIMENTAL
 STUDY OF INFORMATION POOLING1
 BY RICHARD D. MCKELVEY AND TALBOT PAGE
 This paper reports on an experimental study of the way in which individuals make
 inferences from publicly available information. We compare the predictions of a theoreti-
 cal model of a common knowledge inference process with actual behavior. In the
 theoretical model, "perfect Bayesians," starting with private information, take actions; an
 aggregate statistic is made publicly available; the individuals do optimal Bayesian updat-
 ing and take new actions; and the process continues until there is a common knowledge
 equilibrium with complete information pooling. We find that the theoretical model
 roughly predicts the observed behavior, but the actual inference process is clearly less
 efficient than the standard of the theoretical model, and while there is some pooling, it is
 incomplete.
 KEYWORDS: Information pooling, common knowledge, Bayesian learning.
 1. INTRODUCTION
 THIS PAPER REPORTS on an experimental study of a common knowledge infer-
 ence process. We consider a situation in which individuals, starting with differ-
 ing private information, make decisions. A summary statistic of these decisions
 is aggregated into a publicly available signal, and individuals can then use this
 public data to augment their original private information. Then the process is
 iterated. The experiment is designed so that, under certain behavioral assump-
 tions, truthful reporting of current private information is a Bayes-Nash equilib-
 rium, and the equilibrium path leads to a common knowledge equilibrium,
 characterized by complete pooling of information.
 The assumptions leading to a Bayes-Nash equilibrium are strong but they are
 typical of the assumptions in game theoretic analysis: Individuals are assumed to
 have common knowledge of the underlying information structure of the game
 and to have common knowledge of the rationality of the other players. They are
 assumed to make complicated mathematical calculations and apply Bayes theo-
 rem without error to update their beliefs.
 The purpose of the experimental study reported here is to test how closely
 the predictions of a theoretical model of common knowledge inference approxi-
 mate actual behavior. We investigate this question for a model which incorpo-
 rates Bayesian learning from a public signal (it is one of the simplest models of
 a common knowledge inference process which does not pool all the information
 in the first iteration). The inference process of the model is the same as in
 Kobayashi (1977), Jordan (1982), and McKelvey and Page (1984). Thus the
 experiment provides, in a simple setting, a test of these theoretical models.
 1 We acknowledge support of NSF Grant No. IST 85-13679 to the California Institute of
 Technology. We thank Jim Snyder for help with the experiments and data analysis, and Colin
 Camerer and a referee for usful comments on an earlier draft. The data from the experiments
 reported here are available on request from the authors.
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 To explore how well the theoretical model predicts behavior, we looked at
 three types of evidence. First we looked at individual use of private information.
 Second we looked at use of public information. And third we constructed an
 empirical measure of the closeness of fit between the prediction and the actual
 behavior. In focusing on the predictive performance of the model, we did not
 attempt to evaluate directly the realism of the assumptions. (Our own view is
 that the assumptions are unrealistically demanding, and this provides a motiva-
 tion to investigate the predictive performance of this and similar models.)
 The literature relating to our experiment can be briefly traced. Aumann
 (1976) initially defined the notion of common knowledge and showed that when
 two individuals start with a common prior over a probability space, if their
 posterior probabilities for some event become common knowledge, then
 the two posterior probabilities must be the same, with a consensus in beliefs.
 Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982) specified an iterated process of infor-
 mation exchange and showed that for the finite case the process would termi-
 nate in a state where the posterior probabilities were the same and (generically)
 would fully reveal the original, privately held information.
 In a previous paper (McKelvey and Page (1985)), we generalized these results
 to the case where there are n individuals, and only an aggregate statistic (or
 signal) of the individuals' posterior probabilities is made public. In the general-
 ization, the iterated process is a sequential reaction to the public signal
 (identical to Kobayashi's and Jordan's). We showed in the finite case that, under
 a monotonicity condition on the signal, the iterated process leads to consensus,
 and in many cases to complete pooling of the original, privately held informa-
 tion. Brandenberger and Geanakoplos (1987) and Nielsen (1987) generalized
 the common knowledge theorem from an event to a random variable, and
 several researchers independently discovered a simple proof of the more gen-
 eral result (see Nielsen et al. (1989)). The experiment consists of a simple
 example of the general learning process and uses a signal which satisfies the
 monotonicity condition.
 In previous experimental work, Forsythe, Palfrey, and Plott (1982), Plott and
 Sunder (1988), and McKelvey and Ordeshook (1985) also investigated how
 individuals use public information to augment their original private information,
 and whether in doing so, a rational expectations equilibrium is attained. In a
 laboratory securities market, Forsythe, Palfrey, and Plott found that through an
 iterated process there was rapid convergence to a rational expectations equilib-
 rium. In another securities market experiment, Plott and Sunder found that
 when individuals have the same preferences, and when there is a complete set
 of contingent claims markets, there is rapid pooling of information, consistent
 with a rational expectations equilibrium; however, they also found that when
 preferences differ and when there is a single asset without contingent claims,
 there is relatively little pooling of information. In a voting model, where voters
 have access to poll data, McKelvey and Ordeshook (1985) found information
 pooling in which initially uninformed voters gain information from informed
 voters through the aggregate signals of a poll.
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 In Forsythe, Palfrey, and Plott and in Plott and Sunder the inference
 processes are complicated because of the enormous number of potential inter-
 actions among the individuals, and the optimal inference processes are not
 analyzed. In McKelvey and Ordeshook the inference process is analyzed but the
 working assumption is not altogether satisfactory (that during the adjustment
 process each of the uninformed voters believes each of the others is informed in
 spite of the changing poll results which imply that others are uninformed as
 well). Because of the simplicity of design used in this experiment we are able to
 analyze the optimal inference process in closed form.
 2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
 The study consists of several experimental sessions, each consisting of four
 individuals participating in four experiments. At the beginning of a session the
 instructions (Appendix A) are handed out and read aloud. So the instructions
 are common knowledge. In each experiment of a session there are three
 subjects and one assistant, with a different assistant for each experiment. Thus,
 each of the four individuals participates as a subject in three of the four
 experiments and as an assistant in the fourth.
 Each experiment in a session consists of an initial seeding of information
 (described below) followed by six rounds. At the end of every round each
 subject reports a number between zero and one. Each report is made privately
 to the experimenter and is unknown to the other subjects. The subjects know
 that at the end of a session they will be rewarded on the basis of their reports,
 the true state (A or B), and the other experiments of the session. The payoff
 rule, discussed in more detail below, provides an incentive, for each round, for
 each subject j to report j's current posterior probability for A. (We will call a
 report "truthful" if it equals the current posterior probability for A.) The
 subjects in the experiment are not informed of these theoretical expectations,
 and in fact, most are not acquainted with probability theory. The experiments
 are conducted in a way so that the subject need not understand that their
 reports are posterior probabilities.
 We conducted six sessions with inexperienced subjects who were participating
 in the experiment for the first time, and four sessions with experienced subjects
 who had participated previously. In all we conducted 10 sessions with 40
 experiments. The subjects were undergraduates from the California Institute of
 Technology.
 Each experiment has the following structure:
 Seeding of Initial Information: At the beginning of each experiment the
 assistant chooses, by chance, one of two true states of the world, which we call
 state A and state B. Each state has probability of one-half of being chosen. The
 subjects do not know which state is chosen, but each is given the following
 private information on the event: if the state is A, each subject observes the
 number of successes in ten trials from a Bernoulli process with parameter 0.6. If
 the state is B, each subject observes the number of successes in ten trials of a
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 Bernoulli process with parameter 0.4. So, among the three subjects, a total of 30
 independent trials are observed, and each subject's private, initial information is
 based on a different ten trials from the same process.
 Round One: After receiving their private information, each subject is asked
 to report a number between zero and one. The three reports are then collected,
 and the simple average of the three is made publicly available, by writing it on
 the blackboard. The subjects can then make inferences from it to augment their
 private information.
 Round Two: Next, a second report is elicited from each of the subjects. It is
 important to note that the subjects observe no new private information prior to
 making their second and subsequent reports. The second round reports of all
 the subjects are collected and the average written on the blackboard, as the
 second public signal.
 Rounds Three through Five: The same procedure is repeated: a third report
 is elicited and the average made public; a fourth report elicited and the average
 made public; and a fifth report elicited (but not made public).
 Round Six: In the sixth round of each experiment we make all the original
 private information public, by writing on the blackboard the total number of
 successes in the 30 Bernoulli trials. Then the sixth and final report is elicited.
 The last round provides evidence on whether or not the subjects believe that
 there is a pooled information equilibrium by the fifth round. If they do, there
 should be no change from the fifth to the sixth reports.
 The Incentive Mechanism: The incentive mechanism used in the experiment
 is based upon a Proper Scoring Rule (PSR). PSRs provide incentives for an
 individual j to reveal j's current posterior probability of an event. More
 specifically, if j is asked to report a number and is rewarded by a PSR for an
 event E, j will maximize j's expected payoff by reporting j's current posterior
 probability for E (see Savage (1971)).
 The PSR used in this study is a quadratic loss rule (or the Brier rule). This
 rule has been used extensively in the evaluation of probabilistic weather
 forecasts (see Murphy and Winkler (1970)), and is the same in expectation as
 the rule used by Grether (1981), except for an extra gift in Grether's mecha-
 nism. The quadratic loss rule has the property of providing incentives for
 research which are invariant with respect to the current posterior probability
 (see Page (1988) for a discussion of research incentives from PSR).
 The quadratic loss rule is defined as follows. If the state is A, write s = 1; if
 the state is B, write s = 0. Let individual j's report be r (and remember that j
 makes j's report before j observes the true state). Then define individual j's
 payoff as
 (1) 1-(r_ S)2.
 Writing j's current posterior probability for A as q, it is easily checked that j's
 expected payoff is
 (2) (2r-r2)q + (1-r2)(1-q)
 and that this is maximized at r = q.
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 In an experimental context, there is a well-known problem with PSRs. They
 are "flat"-even though they provide an incentive for (risk neutral) individuals
 to report their current posterior probability, they do not provide a strong
 incentive, relative to the experimenter's expected cost of running the experi-
 ment, for the subjects to make inferences and calculate probabilities. The
 quadratic loss rule illustrates this problem. In our normalization of the rule (1),
 the individual's payoff is bounded between zero and one. Thus the rule exhibits
 individual rationality in the sense that individual j cannot lose by participating
 in the experiment. However, n can be guaranteed 0.75 by neglecting j's private
 information and reporting 0.5. In the extreme case where j has perfect informa-
 tion j could only earn an additional 0.25 by reporting i's current posterior
 probability (by reporting r = 1 when the state is A, and r = 0 when the state is
 B). Usually, as in the case of this experiment, an individual's information is
 imperfect, so that only a fraction of the remaining 0.25 is obtainable through
 optimal inference and reporting.
 To sharpen the incentive of the scoring rule, and to relax the assumption of
 risk neutrality, we modify the payoff rule in two ways in our experiments. First,
 like Grether, we use a lottery version of a PSR to relax the assumption of risk
 neutrality. For each report of each subject, the following lottery is conducted at
 the end of the session. If subject j reports r for a particular round and the true
 state is A, j's probability of winning the lottery is 2r - r2; if j reports r and the
 true state is B, j's probability of winning the lottery is 1 - r2. A table of
 probabilities, for each r in increments of 0.02, is provided in the instructions to
 the subjects (See Table Al in Appendix A). By the construction of the lottery,
 an individual's probability of winning a lottery is given by expression (2) and that
 probability is maximized by reporting r = q.
 Second, instead of paying a fixed amount for each lottery won, we pay
 according to a sliding scale. After all the lotteries in the session are conducted,
 we determine the total number of wins (6 reports per subject in each experi-
 ment, times 3 experiments per session, equals 18 reports and 18 lotteries for
 each subject in a session). Then an individual's payment is made according to
 Table I.
 The second modification helps increase the research incentive of the scoring
 rule by increasing the possible variance in payoffs in the range of likely
 TABLE I








 11 or 3
 fewer 3
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 outcomes. However, this modification introduces the potential of "bankruptcy"
 midway through the experiment: i.e., if the lotteries are computed as the
 experiment proceeds, then subjects might find themselves in a position where
 they have already lost more than six lotteries, and hence any reports they make
 from then on are irrelevant for their payoff. To avoid this problem, the lotteries
 are conducted at the end of the session. Thus, although there is an ex-post
 possibility of bankruptcy, this does not affect the incentive properties of the rule
 in an ex-ante sense, since the subject always has some positive expectation of
 not being bankrupt when making the decision.
 Under a fairly weak assumption on preferences, truthful reporting of current
 posterior probabilities is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium to the game defined by a
 session. The assumption is that each individual prefers one lottery to a second if
 the first stochastically dominates the second. See Appendix B for details.
 3. THE COMMON KNOWLEDGE INFERENCE PROCESS
 In this section, we describe the common knowledge inference process, and
 show how it applies to the experiment we have designed.
 We start with a set of n individuals, N = {1,2,..., n}, who each have a
 common prior probability distribution over a probability space. Thus, we have
 the following structure:
 (U, S, p), a probability space,
 A cU, an event of interest,
 r1 = ( 1, -,. . . ., ,nl ), a collection of initial information partitions,
 h: [0, 1]n -* R, an aggregation function.
 We assume U is finite, with p(wo) > 0 for all co E U. We let F be the set of
 all subsets of U, and p: F-* R be a probability measure representing the
 common prior. The partition, flj, is individual i's initial information partition,
 with 7(iC(w) representing the element of rJi containing co. So if co occurs, then
 individual j is informed that co E iJ1(w). Since U is finite, we can enumerate
 jr1 = {nji 1 < i < I), where 'n1ji is the ith element of i's initial partition. Finally,
 h: [0, 1]h -* ,R is an aggregation function, where [0, 1] is the closed unit interval.
 We now consider the following iterative process, which is defined inductively
 on the period t. For each j E N, define, for any c E Q2,
 qjc((J) p(A 7j(t)),
 qt(wR) = q(R) t())
 and, for any to E Q, define H'(wo) = Q, and
 Ht+ (,) = {to' E Ht(tw) Jh(qt(w')) = h(qt(w)))},
 Ht+1= {Ht+1(w) I EU},
 rjt+l = Ht+lvj=Ht+l v 1
 Here Ht+l v <jt is the refinement of the two partitions, Ht+l and wj.
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 This process represents the sequence of events that occurs if individuals
 iteratively learn from public information. Thus, qf(wo) represents j's posterior
 probability for A given j's current private information. We assume that at time
 t, each individual computes qj(tw), and then h(qt(wo)) is publicly announced.
 Then Ht+' is a partition representing the publicly available information at time
 t + 1, while 7wJ +1 is a partition representing individual j's private information
 (as refined by the public information) at time t + 1.
 Using results of Bergin and Brandenburger (1990) on the equivalence of
 additive separability and stochastic regularity, the theorem of McKelvey and
 Page (1986) can be stated:
 THEOREM: If h is additively separable into strictly monotonic components, then
 there is a T such that, for all t > T, and all to E Q2, qj(w) = p(A IHT(w)).
 Thus, eventually, the iterative process of public announcement will achieve
 consensus.
 Our experiment parallels exactly the above theoretical model: In our experi-
 ment, n = 3, so N = (1,2,31. Then, we set
 1=SxY3, where S= {0,1} and Y= {0,1,2, ... ,10},
 I (.5)(.6Y1+Y2+Y3) (.430-Yl 1Y2-Y3) if s = 1,
 (.5) (.4 Y +Y2+Y3) (.6 30 -Yl Y2 -Y3) if s = 0,
 where o = (s, yl, y2, y3)
 A (t {w e&2s = 11,




 h(r) =(r1 + r2+ r3)/3,
 where h is additively separable into the strictly monotonic components, rj/3.
 By direct calculation we find that for the experiment the refinement process
 terminates in three periods (T = 3) and that at the beginning of the third period
 if all the players are fully rational Bayesians, each has obtained the pooled
 information. Moreover, there is complete pooling by the third period if the
 subjects are constrained to report in even hundredths as in the table of
 Appendix A.
 To illustrate the process of inference, we give an example. We suppose that
 the first subject observes 4 successes, the second subject observes 8, and the
 third observes 5, so y = (Y1, Y2, Y3) = (4,8,5). Before the private information is
 observed, each subject has a prior of p(A) = .5 that the state is A. With the
 private information, each player's posterior probability is calculated by Bayes
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.153 on Tue, 05 Sep 2017 21:19:10 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 1328 RICHARD D. MCKELVEY AND TALBOT PAGE
 TABLE II
 FIRST PERIOD POSTERIOR PROBABILITIES OF A
 Number of Posterior
 Successes Probability












 theorem, as shown in Table II. Thus, the first player's posterior probability is
 .30, the second player's is .92, and the third is .50. So ql(w) = (.30,.92,.50). At
 this point, the public information, h(qt(wo)) = (.30 +.92 + .50)/3 = .57 is an-
 nounced, and each subject can now try to learn from the public information.
 Now consider subject l's inference problem. Using the probabilities of Table
 II, subject 1 can construct Table III, which associates a public signal with each
 possible combination of private information for subjects 2 and 3. The (i, j)th
 element of the table is the public signal which results if y = (4, i, j). From this
 calculation, subject 1 learns that the actual distribution of information must be
 one of two cases: (i) both subjects 2 and 3 observed 6 successes, or (ii) one
 subject observed 5 and the other observed 8. In this case, by using the public
 signal to augment l's private information, subject 1 comes close to inferring (a
 sufficient statistic for) the pooled information. Subject 1 learns that the total
 number of successes for the 30 Bernoulli trials is either 4 + 6 + 6 = 16 or
 TABLE III
 THE FIRST PUBLIC SIGNAL AS A FUNCTION OF PRIVATE
 INFORMATION FOR SUBJECTS 2 AND 3a
 Subject 3's Private Information (Y3)
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
 0 .11 .12 .13 .16 .21 .27 .34 .39 .41 .43 .43
 1 .12 .13 .14 .17 .21 .28 .35 .40 .42 .43 .44
 2 .13 .14 .15 .18 .23 .29 .36 .41 .43 .45 .45
 3 .16 .17 .18 .21 .25 .32 .39 .44 .46 .47 .48
 4 .21 .21 .23 .25 .30 .37 .43 .49 .51 .52 .53
 5 .27 .28 .29 .32 .37 .43 .50 .55 .57 .59 .59
 6 .34 .35 .36 .39 .43 .50 .57 .62 .64 .65 .66
 7 .39 .40 .41 .44 .49 .55 .62 .67 .69 .71 .71
 8 .41 .42 .43 .46 .51 .57 .64 .69 .71 .73 .73
 9 .43 .43 .45 .47 .52 .59 .65 .71 .73 .74 .75
 10 .43 .44 .45 .48 .53 .59 .66 .71 .73 .75 .75
 4Subject l's private information is Yi 4. The (i, j)th element of the table is the public
 signal resulting if Y2 = i and Y3 =i.
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 4 + 5 + 8 = 17. With this new information, subject 1 calculates an updated
 posterior probability of A, namely q2(o) = .74, and submits this number as l's
 second period report. Similarly, subjects 2 and 3 make their own inferences and
 submit their second period reports. The second aggregate signal is made public.
 From a similar line of reasoning, subject 1 can now make further inferences
 from the new public data and infer that the only way for this public signal to
 come about is for one of the others to have observed 5 successes and the other
 subject to have observed 8. Thus in the third period, subject 1 can infer that the
 total number of successes in the pooled sample is 17. The other subjects are also
 able to infer the pooled information after the second period signal, hence in the
 third and successive rounds, all subjects will have arrived at consensus, and their
 estimates of the posterior probability will all be based on the total pooled
 information available to the subjects.
 4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
 Figure 1 illustrates the sequence of reports, as well as the optimal reports, for
 four typical experiments. It is apparent from the figure that, at best, the match
 of the actual to the optimal path is inexact. Other plots of actual and optimal
 paths show similar divergences. Given the demanding assumptions and compli-
 cated nature of the model, we do not find the inexact match surprising, and we
 go on to ask more specifically how closely the model predicts actual behavior.
 Predictions for an Individual Bayesian Rationalist: In this subsection we
 consider predictions about individual choice that do not depend on that individ-
 ual's ability to analyze the common knowledge inference process.
 First, because of the rounding off in the table of probabilities in Appendix A,
 it is clear that it is never in the interest of a rational subject to report either 0 or
 1.2 By the table, if j's posterior probability is q and j reports 0, j's lottery
 probability is (1 - q); if j reports .02, j's lottery probability is (1 - q) + (.04)(q).
 Since information is always incomplete in the experiment, 0 <q < 1 and by
 monotonicity the report .02 is always preferable to the report 0. By a similar
 argument the report of .98 is always preferred to a report of 1.00. Of the total of
 the 720 reports in all sessions, 47 were either 0 or 1. The inexperienced subjects
 reported 0 or 1 about 7% of the time, the experienced about 6%.
 Second, in the first and sixth rounds, we can analyze how well the subjects
 update based on an application of Bayes rule. In the first round, if all subjects
 are rational and adopt their Bayes-Nash equilibrium strategies for the entire
 experiment then they should each report truthfully their posterior probabilities.
 In the sixth round, all the original private information is made public, and each
 subject observes the total number of successes in the 30 Bernoulli trials. It is
 now a dominant strategy for each j to truthfully report j's posterior probability.
 In Figure 2a and Figure 2b we plot the predicted optimal reports against the
 actual reports for rounds 1 and 6. If the predictions were perfect, all the points
 2 In the sixth round, it is a dominated strategy to report 0 or 1. In the earlier rounds, if all other
 subjects are rational and adopt their Bayes-Nash equilibrium strategies for the entire experiment,
 then a similar argument can be made that for these rounds there should be no reports of 0 or 1.
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 Period Period
 FIGUmE l. Actual and optimal reports in fur experiments.
 O Subject 1 Optimal Report
 * Subject 2 Actual Report
 would be on the diagonal. Instead, what we see is substantial variance, with
 subjects tending to report posteriors that are a convex combination of the prior
 and the correct posterior. For example, in round 1, a subject who observes four
 successes reports r-=.4 instead of the correct posterior probability of 0.3; a
 subject who observes 9 successes reports r = .8 instead of the correct .96. This
 pattern, referred to as underconfidence by Edwards (1982), suggests that when
 faced with a single application of Bayes theorem, subjects underestimate the
 power of the data to modify the prior (see also Grether (1980)).3 We see the
 same pattern in the sixh round reports.
 3 An alternate interpretation is that the subjects maintain a skeptical attitude towards the veracity
 of the experimental procedures. While we did not attempt to deceive the subjects and went out of
 our way to insure that the subjects could verify the experimental procedures we used were those we
 described in the instructions, we cannot eliminate this possibility. If the subjects distrusted any
 aspect of the experimental procedures, underconfidence could be a rational response.
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 FIGURE 2a.-Actual report vs. optimal report (round 1).
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 FIGURE 2b.-Actual report vs. optimal report (round 6).
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 TABLE IV
 REGRESSIONS FOR ALL TEN SESSIONS
 (Standard errors in parentheses, n = 120)
 C LPRI LPUBt_ - LPOOL R2
 LREP1 .009 .805 .61
 (.088) (.059)
 LREP2 - .013 .642 .966 .68
 (.087) (.069) (.110)
 LREP3 .193 .340 1.093 .77
 (.104) (.084) (.080)
 LREP4 .092 .332 .889 .77
 (.110) (.093) (.066)
 LREP5 .147 .219 .892 .75
 (.119) (.100) (.066)
 LREP6 .052 .141 .537 .382 .79
 (.110) (.105) (.095) (.091)
 Qualitative Predictions from the Vhole Model: In the experiment, the more
 complicated inference problem arises in rounds 1-5, where there is both private
 and public information to untangle. Here, roughly speaking, there could be two
 types of departure from the predicted, optimal path. The subjects could rely on
 the public information too little, in which case the public signal would not pool
 the private information. Or they could rely on the public signal too much, by
 discounting their private information, with the danger that the public signal
 becomes a random walk. If the subjects make the optimal inferences discussed
 in Section 2, they would begin by relying heavily on the private information and
 then gradually shift their reliance to the public signal as it came to incorporate
 the pooled information.
 Table IV shows a series of regressions for all 10 sessions. LREPt is the log
 odds of the subjects' report in the tth round (reports of 0 were set to .02 and
 reports of 1.00 were set to 0.98). LPRI is the log odds of the correct Bayesian
 posterior probability, given a subject's private information. LPUBt_1 is the log
 odds of the public information in round t - 1, purged of the individuals' own
 immediate contribution. (From a public signal, each subject can infer the
 average of the others' reports for that round. LPUBt_1 is the log odds of the
 average of the others' reported probabilities for the preceding round. When
 subject j is making a report, it is the public signal from the preceding round
 which is available to j.) LPOOL is the log odds of the correct Bayesian
 posterior probability, given the pooled information. We use the log odds form to
 provide greater symmetry in the error term. Regressions with the untrans-
 formed variables, with the odds, and with the log forms yield similar results, as
 do regressions disaggregated to the sessions of inexperienced and experienced
 subjects.
 We define the null hypothesis to be the case in which all the players are fully
 rational Bayesians. Under this hypothesis, in the first regression, if the subjects
 were making optimal inferences, the coefficient for the constant, C, would be 0,
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 and the coefficient for LPRI would be 1. On the basis of the data, we can reject
 this hypothesis at level a =.01. The underconfidence noted in Figure 2 shows
 up here as a coefficient of LPRI less than 1 (it is .81).
 Under the null hypotheses, in regressions 4 and 5, the coefficients for C
 would be 0 and the coefficient for LPUB,_1 would be 1. These regressions also
 suggest rejecting the null hypothesis (although not so strongly). Under the null
 hypothesis, in regression 6, if the subjects were rational Bayesians (following the
 Bayes-Nash equilibrium path), LPUBt -1 and LPOOL would be equal, implying
 a singular moment matrix. If the subjects were "almost Bayes rational" or there
 were round off errors, the moment matrix would be nonsingular and the
 variables LPUBt-1 and LPOOL should explain most of the variance, but
 because of the high colinearity of LPUBt -1 and LPOOL, these variables would
 have large standard errors, and perhaps be individually insignificant. The
 coefficients of C and LPRI would be zero. If each subject were rational, but
 believed the others were not, the coefficient of LPUBt- 1 would be zero, and the
 coefficient of LPOOL would be 1. The regression in period 6 does not fall into
 any of these categories. The coefficients of C and LPRI are not significantly
 different from zero, but we see that both LPUBt -1 and LPOOL have significant
 effects.
 Regressions 1, 4, 5, and 6 are correctly specified under the null hypothesis,
 but not 2 and 3. The correct specification for the latter two regressions would be
 a highly complicated nonlinear form. Nonetheless, these regressions are useful
 for qualitative comparison over the entire iterative process.
 The regressions rule out complete Bayesian rationality. But they nonetheless
 suggest a partial rationality. Note that in the first round, subjects rely heavily on
 their private information, but in each succeeding round they rely less on their
 private information and more on the public information. Here we see clearly the
 pattern whereby the subjects gradually discard their private information (LPRI)
 as it gets incorporated into the public signal (LPUBt_d. The coefficients of
 LPRI begin at .81 in round one and decline monotonically through round five,
 with the standard errors monotonically increasing. This is the pattern we would
 expect if the subjects were making inferences somewhat close to the optimal
 inferences.
 An Empirical Measure of Predictive Fit: To see how close the subjects come
 to optimal inference, we construct a measure of efficiency. First, we calculate
 EROt-the expected payoff in period t if all the subjects are rational. (To
 simplify the calculation we use a payoff structure in which winning a lottery is
 worth $1 and losing a lottery $3.) Next, we calculate ERAt-the expected payoff
 in period t for the actual reports. These two expectations are shown in Figure 3,
 for sessions 1-6 (inexperienced subjects), and sessions 7-10 (experienced sub-
 jects). By construction of this measure of efficiency, if subject j neglected j's
 initial private information and the subsequent public information and reported
 only on the basis of j's original prior, j's ERAt would be zero for all rounds.
 The plots of ER4 t show that for all three groups in each succeeding period
 from 1 to 4 the expected payoff increases for the actual reports. This means that
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 Sessions 1- 6 Sessions 7- 10
 (Inexperienced subjects) (Experienced subjects)
 2.00- 2.00 Optimal EROt
 Optimal EROt




 0 , 0 _ __ _ . _. _ _ _ _
 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
 Period Period
 FIGURE 3.-Optimal and actual expected payoffs, by period.
 the subjects are making use of the private information in the first period and
 both private and public information in succeeding periods up to period 5.
 Compared to the optimal standard, the subjects are a little slow in beginning
 their adjustment and a little slow in finishing it (they seem to have "inferential
 inertia").
 In period 5, ERAt actually declines. By the 5th period, preceding errors in
 inference and computation are fed back into the public signal, some several
 times, with possible compounding of errors. Thus, while the public signal tends
 to aggregate the originally dispersed information, as can be seen by the increase
 of ERAt in rounds 1-4 and by the regressions, it may also become contami-
 nated as it compounds preceding errors. In sessions 1-6 and 7-10 the jump in
 ERAt from round 5 to 6 suggests that the subjects do not believe that the fourth
 public signal is an error-free pooled information posterior probability (which it
 isn't).
 We define the relative efficiency for a whole session to be ERAt/EROt. The
 efficiency for the inexperienced subjects (sessions 1-6) was 69 percent; for the
 experienced subjects (sessions 7-10) was 85 percent. But while it appears that
 there is indeed improvement in inference through learning, not all of this
 difference is attributable to learning.
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 5. CONCLUSION
 In this experiment, individuals make inferences on the basis of both private
 and public information. The experiment illustrates operational steps by which
 the behavior of rational individuals leads to a common knowledge equilibrium.
 The experiment is designed so that if the subjects are rational and each believes
 the others are rational, there should be complete pooling of information (in a
 utility relevant sense) by the third period. The optimal inference process
 provides a standard of reference to measure the efficiency of inference of actual
 individuals.
 In the experiment, we find clear evidence that individuals make use of the
 public information to augment their original private information and increase
 their expected payoffs. The public signal comes to incorporate the original
 private information. However, there is also clear evidence that the actual
 process of information pooling is imperfect.
 In the optimal inference process, rational individuals should begin by relying
 on their private information and then gradually shift to rely on the public signal
 as it comes to incorporate more and more of the original private information.
 We observe this shift in the regression analysis, but we also observe errors in the
 use of Bayes theorem, and other computational or inferential errors in reaction
 to the public signal.
 We define a measure of the efficiency of inference to be the ratio of the
 aggregate expected payoff under optimal inference. In the experienced group,
 the relative efficiency of the actual inference process is 85%; for the inexperi-
 enced group 69%.
 An important empirical question is how closely actual behavior approximates
 the rational behavior of theoretical models. As a general conclusion, we would
 say that a rough approximation of the common knowledge inference pro-
 cess (similar but simpler than those in Kobayashi (1977), Jordan (1982), and
 McKelvey and Page (1986)) is borne out in the experimental evidence. However,
 the actual inference process is clearly less efficient than the standard in the
 theoretical models, and while there is some pooling, it is incomplete.
 Division of Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology,
 Pasadena, CA 91125, U.S.A.,
 and
 Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912, U.S.A.
 Manuscript received November, 1985; final revision received October, 1989.
 APPENDIX A
 EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS
 This is an experiment on individual decision making. The purpose of the experiment is to study
 how individuals use two sources of information in making decisions about an unknown fact. You will
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 be paid for your participation in the experiment. Your payments will depend partly on your
 decisions and partly on chance. If you are careful, and make good decisions, you have a good chance
 of making a considerable amount of money.
 The experiment is symmetric with respect to all the subjects. The instructions, the reward rule,
 and the lottery number table are the same for each of you. The experiment will be repeated four
 times. In each experiment one of you will be an assistant, and the rest will be subjects.
 The Unknown Fact of the Experiment: Before you, you see two containers, each containing ten
 dice. All the dice are ten sided. In one container the dice are red and in the other the dice are
 white. Each red die has 6 marked faces and 4 unmarked faces, while each white die has 4 marked
 faces and 6 unmarked. At the beginning of each experiment, the assistant will select by chance one
 container of dice. The container of dice which is not selected will be set aside, and during the
 remaining part of the experiment, only the selected container of dice will be used. The unknown
 fact of the experiment, for you and the other subjects, is whether the dice selected are red or white.
 Your Rewards: There are several rounds in each experiment. For each round, you will be
 required to choose a number, r, which we call your report. You will be paid for each round by
 means of a lottery corresponding to that round. Your probability of winning the lottery for a
 particular round depends upon the number r you report for that round, and upon the unknown
 fact. If the dice are red, and you report r, your probability of winning is read off from column 2 of
 the accompanying table. If the dice are white, your probability of winning is read off from column 3.
 For example, suppose you report r = .32 for some round of the experiment. If the dice are red your
 probability of winning the lottery for that round is .538. If the dice are white, your probability of
 winning is .898. The probability of winning a lottery is related to your reported r as follows. If the
 dice are red, your probability of winning is 2r - r2. If the dice are white, your probability of winning
 is 1 -r2
 At the beginning of each round of the experiment you will be given some information which you
 can use to assess how likely you think it is that the dice are red or white. At the end of each round
 you report on the worksheet: in column (1) your r; in column (2) your probability of winning if the
 dice are red; in column (3) your probability of winning if the dice are white.
 At the end of the experiment, you will be told whether the dice are red or white. If they are red,
 circle all the numbers in column (2), for the experiment. If they are white, circle all the numbers in
 column (3), for the experiment.
 At the end of all 4 experiments your lotteries will be drawn and your earnings calculated. For
 each of your rounds, a three digit random number between .000 and .999 will be drawn. If it is less
 than the number you circled for that round, you win. If the random number is greater than or equal
 to your circled number, you lose. If you win, write a + in column (4) of the worksheet. Count the
 total number of wins for all three experiments, and read your payoff from the payoff chart on the
 blackboard.
 Your Information: At the beginning of the first round, you will be given your own, private
 information concerning the unknown fact. After the container is selected the assistant will throw the
 dice from the container selected. You will be told how many of the dice have a marked face up.
 Record this information in the box, column (A) of the worksheet. This is your own, private
 information. Do not share it with the other subjects. Each of the others will also have his own
 private information in the form of an independent throw of the selected dice.
 At the end of the first round, the assistant will record reported r's from your worksheets. The
 average of all subjects' reported r's (including yours) will be written on the blackboard. This is your
 public information, which you can use to augment your private information in round two. Record
 this average of the reports in the box, column (B) of the worksheet (corresponding to round 2).
 At the end of round 2, the reports for that round will be collected and their average written on
 the blackboard. Write this public information in the box in column (B) (corresponding to round 3).
 In round 3, you can use this new public information to augment your original private information
 and the earlier public information.
 The following rounds will proceed in the same fashion. At the beginning of a round, you will be
 given new, public information, which is the average of the reports for the previous round. At the end
 of the round, you will make your new report, based upon the new information and the old
 information.
 The last round, round six, is a little different. The total number of marked faces appearing in all
 three samples (30 observations in all) will be written on the blackboard. At the end of this last
 round, with this additional public information, you will make your final report.
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 TABLE A
 TABLE OF LOTERIES FOR EXPERIMENTS
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
 Probability of Winning Probability of Winning
 Your Report If Dice If Dice Your Report If Dice If Dice
 r are Red are White r are Red are White
 0.00 0.000 1.000 0.50 0.750 0.750
 0.02 0.040 1.000 0.52 0.770 0.730
 0.04 0.078 0.998 0.54 0.788 0.708
 0.06 0.116 0.996 0.56 0.806 0.686
 0.08 0.154 0.994 0.58 0.824 0.664
 0.10 0.190 0.990 0.60 0.840 0.640
 0.12 0.226 0.986 0.62 0.856 0.616
 0.14 0.260 0.980 0.64 0.870 0.590
 0.16 0.294 0.974 0.66 0.884 0.564
 0.18 0.328 0.968 0.68 0.898 0.538
 0.20 0.360 0.960 0.70 0.910 0.510
 0.22 0.392 0.952 0.72 0.922 0.482
 0.24 0.422 0.942 0.74 0.932 0.452
 0.26 0.452 0.932 0.76 0.942 0.422
 0.28 0.482 0.922 0.78 0.952 0.392
 0.30 0.510 0.910 0.80 0.960 0.360
 0.32 0.538 0.898 0.82 0.968 0.328
 0.34 0.564 0.884 0.84 0.974 0.294
 0.36 0.590 0.870 0.86 0.980 0.260
 0.38 0.616 0.856 0.88 0.986 0.226
 0.40 0.640 0.840 0.90 0.990 0.190
 0.42 0.664 0.824 0.92 0.994 0.154
 0.44 0.686 0.806 0.94 0.996 0.116
 0.46 0.708 0.788 0.96 0.998 0.078
 0.48 0.730 0.770 0.98 1.000 0.040
 0.50 0.750 0.750 1.00 1.000 0.000
 APPENDIX B
 In this appendix we sketch the argument showing that truthful reporting is a Bayes-Nash
 equilibrium. (Recall that a truthful strategy for j is for j to report j's posterior probability for A,
 conditioned on j's current information set.)
 First, consider j's strategy for a given, fixed information set in round t; call it vi-. Recalling (2)
 and the first modification of the Brier rule, we note that in expectation for w E ij'iJ, j's probability of
 winning the lottery in round t corresponding to j's report is given by (2) where q is j's posterior
 probability of A based on rrj'i. As in Section 2, this probability is maximized by j reporting r = q.
 Setting r = q, we write j's maximized probability as
 P3(q) = (2q - q2)q + (1 - q2)(1 - q) = 1 - q + q2.
 Thus p is a convex function of q.
 Second, consider the effect of a possible refinement of an element of j's partition, ir, say from ir
 to {ii1, IT2), where {7 1, IT2) partitions 7r. Then writing q1 = p(A ir ii) for j's truthful strategy when
 to E-ir and q2 = p(A 12) when t E r2, we have
 q = p( AI ) )r + P(+1) P+p(A 1T2) P(IT2)
 P(ITi1) + P(IT2) P(ITl) + P(I2)
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 so q is a convex combination of q, and q2. Since p( ) is a convex function,
 P(Trl) P(7T2)
 P(I1) +P(722) P(l1) +P(172)
 where the right-hand side is j's probability of winning the lottery when j reports truthfully under
 the refinement. More generally we can use Jensen's inequality to show that in expectation for w E 7T
 a refinement of 7r (with truthful reporting) sometimes increases and never decreases j's probability
 of winning the lottery (compared with reporting q = p(A 1Tr)).
 Third, we consider what happens when every subject is reporting truthfully (and "myopically")
 round by round, and j considers a change from j's truthful strategy. Under truthful reporting, every
 subject every round, there is complete refinement of j's information partition in rounds 3, 4, 5, and
 6. Thus truthful reporting for all 6 rounds leads to maximal probabilities of winning the lotteries
 corresponding to rounds 3, 4, 5, and 6. Truthful reporting in round 1 also maximizes j's probability
 of winning the first round's lottery, since nothing j can do will affect j's information set for the first
 round. Individual j cannot affect j's information set for round 2 either, because this information set
 is determined by the other subjects' reports (along with j's first period information set 1), but not j's
 first period report (j can disentangle j's report from the public signal so the signal is equivalent to
 the sum of the others' reports, as in the discussion of Table III). Thus truthful reporting in round 2
 maximizes the probability of winning the second lottery. We conclude that truthful reporting in all
 six rounds leads to maximal probabilities of winning the round by round lotteries. Another way of
 putting the matter is that by departing from truthful reporting j might be able to change j's
 information sets in rounds 3, 4, 5, or 6. But in doing so j could only make things worse for j, since
 j's information sets for these rounds were already fully refined under truthful reporting.
 Fourth, we are now ready to take into account the second modification, from wins and losses in
 individual lotteries to the composite lottery and the sliding scale of Table I. Consider two situations,
 situation 1 where everyone reports truthfully every round and situation 2 where j makes some
 departure from situation 1. We have just seen that in making the departure, none of the
 probabilities for the individual rounds will go up for j and some may go down. Now consider the
 cumulative distribution function (CDF) for the composite lottery over the payoff outcomes
 (3,4,7, 10, 13, 16, 19, 22). It is easy to check that the CDF for j in situation 1 stochastically dominates
 the CDF for j in situation 2 (or is equal to it).
 But our behavorial assumption is that each subject prefers one composite lottery to a second if
 the first stochastically dominates the second. Thus "myopic" truthful reporting for every round by
 every subject is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. (By a similar argument it is easy to see that if the first
 part of the experiment were only 3 instead of 5 rounds, truthful reporting would be a dominant
 strategy.)
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